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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-The Tenth Circuit
Strikes Down New Mexico's Ban on Targeted Direct-Mail
Lawyer Advertising-Revo v. Disciplinary Board of the

Supreme Court
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, lawyers have emphasized "that the promotion of justice, rather
than the earning of fees, is the goal of the [legal] profession."' Although many
lawyers still feel this way, the Supreme Court has noted that "[iln this day, we do
not belittle the person who earns his living by the strength of his arm or the force
of his mind. ...[T]he belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become
an anachronism ....2

The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar3 has led to an
"avalanche" of lawyer advertising.4 Lawyer advertising is being cited by many
attorneys and state bar organizations as a significant factor contributing to the
public's declining respect for the legal profession.'
Although most New Mexico lawyers tolerate lawyer advertising in general,
whether or not New Mexico should permit direct-mail lawyer advertising to
accident victims remains highly controversial. In 1992, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico enacted Rule 16-701(C)(4), which amended the New Mexico Rules of
Professional Conduct to ban all direct-mail advertising to personal injury victims
and family members of wrongful death victims. 6 In 1996, Rule 16-701(C)(4) was
challenged successfully in Revo v. DisciplinaryBoard of the Supreme Court.7 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the New Mexico ban on direct-mail
solicitations to accident victims was unconstitutional.'
This Note briefly discusses the evolution of lawyer advertising, explains and
analyzes the rationale of Revo, and explores the implications of Revo for New
Mexico lawyers.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 9
M. Terrence Revo, a personal injury lawyer in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
advertised by sending targeted direct-mail to persons injured in automobile
accidents.' 0 Revo discontinued this practice in 1992, when the Supreme Court of
1. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (quoting Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L REV. 674 (1958)).
2. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. See Tonia S. Goolsby, Note, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: Does Ambulance-Chasing in Florida
Justify Advertising Reform in Arkansas?, 49 ARK. L REv. 795, 795 (1997) (citing David R. Gienapp, Issues
Facingthe Legal Professionas the Profession Preparesto Enter the Twenty-First Century,40 S.D. L. REV. 207,
208 (1995)).
5. See id.
6. See N.M. R. PROF. CONDUCT 16-701(C)(4) (as amended, effective August 1, 1992).
7. 106 F.3d 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2515 (1997).
8. See id. at 936.
9. The facts presented in this Part are paraphrased from Revo, 106 F.3d at 931-32.
10. Revo's proposed solicitation letter read as follows:
[Date] "LAWYER ADVERTISEMENT"'
[Name and Address]
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New Mexico enacted Rule 16-701(C)(4)." Revo sued the state, arguing that the ban
2 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
violated both the First Amendment'
3
Fourteenth Amendment.
The federal district court agreed with Revo, holding that New Mexico's blanket
ban on direct-mail advertising violated Revo's First Amendment and Equal
5
Protection rights.'" The district court permanently enjoined the
6 Rule's enforcement
ruling.
court's
district
the
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
7
The Supreme Court heard its first lawyer advertising case, Bates v. State Bar,
in 1977. The appellants in Bates, licensed practicing attorneys in Arizona,
advertised that they were offering "legal services at very reasonable fees"'" and
published a list of their fees for certain services in a daily newspaper.' 9 This
advertisement constituted a clear violation of Arizona's Disciplinary Rule 2101(B).2 °
The Supreme Court analogized Bates to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc.,2t a case in which a Virginia statute

Dear [Title and Name]:
The Albuquerque Police [State Police] Department records show that you were recently involved
in an auto accident. Unfortunately, such accidents are an all too common fact of life and can
cause serious concern. I understand that dealing with injuries, emergency rooms, medical bills,
lost earnings, damaged autos, rental cars, and insurance adjusters can be difficult and
frustrating.
In our system of legal justice, the injured person has certain rights and protections under the law.
It is important that you know about your rights before deciding what to do.
I have been an attorney for more than 16 years. I invite you to make an appointment for a free
initial consultation and evaluation of your case. We will do our best to answer all your questions
and you are under no obligation to hire my firm.
I accept personal injury cases on a contingency fee basis, which means that my fee is based
upon a percentage of your total recovery, before costs are deducted. Regardless of the outcome,
the client will bear the expenses of the case. Some exceptions may apply. I have found that the
earlier I become involved in a case, the more I can do on your behalf, therefore, I invite you to
call today.
If you have already retained the services of an attorney, I hope that your case will proceed well
and that you will have a positive outcome. If you are not represented, then I ask you to think
about what is at stake, now and for the future. If we can help please call.
Respectfully,
M. Terrence Revo
Revo, 106 F.3d at 931 n.2.
It. See N.M. R. PROF. CoNDUcr 16-701(C)(4) compiler's annotation.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. See Revo at 932.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 936.
17. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
18. Id. at 354.
19. See id.
20. This rule prohibited lawyer advertising through "newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or
television announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial
publicity." Id. at 355 (quoting ARIZ.SUP. Cr. R. 29(a), DR 2-101(B), available in 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (Supp.
1976) (repealed 1984)).
21. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs. 2 2 In
Virginia Pharmacy,the Court held that such communication, which it characterized
simply as "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price," was protected
commercial speech under the First Amendment. 23 Similarly, in Bates, the Court held
that application of Arizona's disciplinary rule to appellants' advertisement violated
the First Amendment. 24 The Bates Court maintained that commercial speech
informing the public of the availability of and prices for products and services
promotes accurate and informed decisionmaking.25 Therefore, a state may not
prohibit the truthful advertising of legal services.26

The Bates Court, however, pointed out that, while lawyer advertising could not
be subject to blanket suppression, it may be regulated.27 Indeed, a year later in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar2 the Supreme Court held that the state of Ohio could
regulate the direct, in-person solicitation of accident victims by attorneys for
pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to cause harm to prospective clients.29
The Court reasoned that a public advertisement, like the one in Bates, simply offers
the recipient information and allows the recipient to act upon it or not.3° In contrast,
in-person solicitations may pressure the recipient, often for an immediate response,
without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection. 3' Subsequently, the
Court in In re RMJ32 held that the risk of "fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct' was so likely in the context
of in-person solicitation, that such solicitation could be prohibited. 33 In other
words, in-person solicitation actually undermines the individual and societal interest
in promoting accurate and informed decision-making identified in Bates.3
Although the OhralikCourt permitted Ohio to prohibit "ambulance-chasing," the
Court noted that a lawyer may give out unsolicited legal advice as long as the
lawyer does not accept paid employment resulting from this advice.35 This
observation became the holding in In re Primus,36 in which the Court held that a
lawyer who communicated an offer of free assistance on behalf of a nonprofit
organization to a lay person was protected under the First Amendment. 37 In Primus,
the lawyer neither engaged in personal solicitation nor was he motivated by
pecuniary gain, in contrast to Ohralik where the solicitation subject to regulation
was both personal and for pecuniary gain.38

22. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 363 (citing Virginia Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 749-50).
23. Virginia Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 761.
24. See id. at 384.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 364.
See id. at 384.
at 383.
See id.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
See id. at 454.
See id. at 457.
See id.
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
See id. at 202.
See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458.
See id.
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
See id. at 422.
See id.
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In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court,3 9 the

Supreme Court extended Bates when it ruled that attorneys can solicit legal business
for pecuniary gain through printed advertisements containing truthful and
nondeceptive information 4° regarding the legal rights of potential clients.4' Zauderer
had placed an advertisement in Ohio newspapers announcing his willingness to
represent women who had suffered injuries from a particular intrauterine device. 2
The Court distinguished Ohralik because the advertisement in Zauderer did not
entail the same hazards associated with in-person solicitation, a type of solicitation
which presents "unique regulatory difficulties because it is 'not visible or otherwise
open to public scrutiny."' 43 As it did in Bates, the Court stressed the value of free
flowing commercial information" and rejected the state's argument that lawyer
advertising would encourage unnecessary litigation.45 The Court observed that a
person should not suffer a wrong silently instead of taking legal action.46
Additionally, the Court rejected Ohio's arguments that lawyer advertising presents
a unique regulatory problem of weeding out accurate statements from false or
misleading ones.47
The Supreme Court further extended Zauderer in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n 48 by holding that lawyers could solicit legal business for pecuniary gain by
sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face
particular legal problems. 49 The Court reasoned that "the First Amendment does not
permit a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient; the State may not
constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those
whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable." 5 Like the print
advertising in Zauderer, the Court found that targeted, direct-mail solicitation
"generally-'poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence' than does
in-person solicitation."'" By building on its opinion in Zauderer,the Shapero Court
enlarged the scope of protected lawyer advertising.
After thirteen years of pro-lawyer advertising decisions, the Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, took the other side in FloridaBar v. Went ForIt, Inc.52 The Court
held that Florida could constitutionally prohibit its lawyers from using direct-mail

39. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
40. The Supreme Court had previously ruled in In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191 (1982), that lawyers can advertise
the names of the jurisdictions in which they are licensed to practice. The Court later ruled in Peel v. Attorney
Registration& DisciplinaryCommission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), that lawyers can also advertise certification by the
National Board of Trial Advocacy.
41. See Zauderer,471 U.S. at 647.
42. See id. at 630.
43. Id. at 641 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466).
44. See id. at 646.
45. See id. at 642.
46. See id. at 643 (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977)).
47. See id. at 643.
48. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
49. See id. at 471.
50. Id. at 473-74.
51. Id. at 475 (quoting Zauderer,471 U.S. at 642).
52. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
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advertising to solicit the business of personal injury or wrongful death victims or
their relatives for thirty days after an accident. 3
The majority in Florida Bar found that states have a substantial interest in
protecting the privacy of potential clients and in regulating the practice of
professions within their boundaries.' Consequently, the majority distinguished this
case from Shapero in three ways. First, the Court noted that "Shapero'streatment
of privacy was casual" because "Shapero did not seek to justify its regulation as a
55
measure undertaken to prevent lawyers' invasions of privacy interests." Instead
of making a privacy-based argument, the state in Shapero focused primarily on the
risks of overreaching that can result from targeted solicitations.56 Second, Shapero
dealt with a blanket ban on all forms of direct-mail solicitation without regard for
time frame and the type of recipient involved. 7 Finally, the state in Shapero failed
to gather evidence that would demonstrate that targeted direct-mail would actually
cause any harm. 8
In contrast, the dissent in FloridaBar observed that the majority's decision
undercuts the line of precedents established by the Court to protect First
Amendment speech, to the detriment of those victims most in need of legal
assistance. 9 The dissent found it to be "uncontroverted" that when an accident leads
to death or injury, it is usually immediately necessary to investigate the incident,
identify witnesses, and preserve evidence.' Given the Court's reasoning in Shapero
that a letter "can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or
discarded," the dissent felt that the controlling effect of Shapero could not be
avoided in FloridaBar,which also involved direct-mail advertising.61 The dissent
was not persuaded by the majority's privacy interest argument, noting that in
Zauderer the Court specifically observed that advertising is not to be suppressed
simply because some people may find it to be offensive.62 If anything, the dissent
noted that "direct solicitation may serve vital purposes and promote the
administration of justice. '"63
FloridaBar is the most recent Supreme Court case to address lawyer advertising.
Two years after this 5-4 decision, the Revo case came before the Tenth Circuit.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE IN REVO
As a general rule, false, misleading or deceptive attorney advertising is not
protected by the First Amendment.' However, even if advertising is truthful and

53. See id. at 620.
54. See id. at 625.
55. Id. at 629.

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See id. at 636.
Id. at 637 (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1988)).
See id. at 638.
Id. at 639.
See In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
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accurate, it may still be subject to state regulation.6 5 In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,66 the Supreme Court articulated an
analysis to be used in commercial speech cases to determine when regulation of
commercial speech is constitutionally permissible. 67 This analysis, known as the
CentralHudson test, made its first appearance in a lawyer advertising case, In re
RMJ, in 1982. The RMJ Court held that a state must have a substantial interest in
order to regulate lawyer
advertising, and that this regulation must be in proportion
68
to the interest served.
In Florida Bar, the Court defined the Central Hudson test in terms of three
separate but related prongs: 1) a state must assert a substantial interest in support
of its regulation; 2) a state must "demonstrate that the restriction on commercial
speech directly and materially advances that interest"; and 3) the regulation must
be "narrowly drawn." 69 Each prong of the CentralHudson test must be satisfied by
a state before a court will deem a regulation of lawyer advertising constitutional.70
In Revo, New Mexico argued that although the advertisement in question
concerned a lawful activity, it was not protected speech because it was misleading.7
New Mexico further argued that even if the advertisement was not misleading and,
thus, protected speech, it was still subject to regulation because the CentralHudson
test was met. New Mexico asserted: 1) that it had a substantial interest in
"maintaining the public's respect for the legal system" and in protecting the privacy
of accident victims;72 2) that a ban on personal injury solicitation letters would
directly and materially advance that interest; 73 and 3) that the regulation was
narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose.74
The Tenth Circuit rejected New Mexico's argument that Revo's letters were
misleading because the Disciplinary Board itself admitted that Revo's letters were
"carefully worded to avoid creating false impressions." 75 The Disciplinary Board
also admitted that it had not received a single complaint from any recipient stating
that the letter was false, misleading, unfairly coercive or "caused them to enter an
attorney-client relationship unwillingly or without adequate information. 76
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the state's argument that Revo's letters were
inherently misleading because they were sent to accident victims, who as a class are
especially vulnerable.' The court reasoned that because the letters were sent to all
accident victims, regardless of their financial well-being, New Mexico's argument

65. See id.
66. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
67. See In re RMJ, 455 U.S. at 203 n.15 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
68. See id. at 203.
69. Florida Bar v. Went For It., Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995).
70. See id.
71. See Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 106 F.3d 929,932-33 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 2515 (1997).
72. Id. at 933.
73. See id. at 934.
74. See id. at 935.
75. Id. at 932.
76. See id.
77. See id.
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that the recipients of these letters were "not sophisticated enough to know that they
are being preyed upon" was without merit.7"
After concluding that the advertising in question was not false or misleading, the
Tenth Circuit decided that New Mexico's asserted interests in protecting the privacy
of its citizens and in protecting the image of the bar constituted "substantial
Supreme
interests" under the first prong of the Central Hudson test because the
79
Court had previously recognized these interests as such in FloridaBar. The Tenth
Circuit, however, found that New Mexico's interest in protecting the reputation of
its bar did not meet the second prong of the test; New Mexico's ban did8 not directly
and materially advance its interest in protecting the integrity of the bar. ' The Tenth
Circuit reasoned that those New Mexico lawyers who use direct-mail solicitation
and have been accused of unethical practices gain only a minority of their clients
through direct-mail solicitation.81 Therefore, a majority of these lawyers' clients
will still be subject to bad lawyering. 8 In other words, the ban does not protect the
reputation of the bar effectively. Moreover, the ban may prevent other ethical and
competent lawyers who may choose to use direct-mail solicitation to advertise in
the future from serving the public.83
Although the Tenth Circuit did not find that New Mexico's interest in protecting
the bar's reputation met the second prong of the CentralHudson test, it found that
the ban directly and materially advanced New Mexico's interest in protecting the
privacy of accident victims by completely eliminating the receipt of these letters
altogether.84 Thus, the Revo Court held that the advertising ban fulfilled the second
prong of the CentralHudson test.85
Despite the fact that New Mexico's privacy interest was found to satisfy the first
two prongs of the test, the Tenth Circuit concluded that New Mexico's ban failed
to meet the final prong.86 New Mexico's chosen restriction was not narrowly
8
tailored to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The
Tenth Circuit came to this conclusion based on the Supreme Court's analysis in
FloridaBar.88
The Supreme Court in FloridaBar found that the thirty-day rule was narrowly
tailored because it was limited to a brief period of time and because there were
many other ways for injured Floridians to learn about legal representation during
that thirty-day period.89 The Tenth Circuit noted that the thirty-day rule was held to
be constitutional because it was both narrow in scope and in duration." The Tenth
Circuit concluded that New Mexico's complete ban on all personal injury direct-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 933.
id. at 934.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 935.

85. See id.

86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.

89. See FloridaBar, 515 U.S. at 633; see also Revo, 106 F.3d. at 935.
90. See Revo, 106 F.3d at 935.
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mail solicitations was overbroad in both scope and duration. 9' Consequently, the
Tenth Circuit found the Revo case to be more analogous to Shapero, which also
involved a complete ban, than to Florida Bar, which involved only a thirty-day
ban.92

The Tenth Circuit rejected New Mexico's argument that its ban was narrowly
tailored because it only affected four lawyers.93 The court pointed out that, in fact,
the ban affects every New Mexico attorney who might ever decide to take on
personal injury clients or who might decide to use direct-mail advertising to reach
such clients.94 Moreover, the court observed that "[m]erely because targeted, directmail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes
does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected commercial speech." 95
Additionally, New Mexico failed to show why it could not use less burdensome
alternatives to address its concerns. 96 The Tenth Circuit pointed to three specific
alternatives. First, the Tenth Circuit noted that New Mexico could have subjected
the personal injury direct-mail letters to a screening process to prevent misleading
potential clients; all other attorney direct-mail solicitations are subjected to this
screening process. 97 Moreover, screening would be a feasible alternative in light of
the state's claim that only four attorneys even send these letters.9" Second, if the
harms identified by New Mexico actually stemmed from the unethical practices of
a handful of lawyers, the state could have enforced existing regulations under the
Rules of Professional Conduct to address these harms. 99 Finally, the court noted that
New Mexico failed to show why a thirty-day ban, similar to that in FloridaBar,
would not adequately address the harms at issue."°
Although New Mexico argued that "the harms it has identified are without time
limits, and that grieving does not fit into a neat thirty-day cycle,' °. the court
responded by noting that the Constitution favors the disclosure of information. 2
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit found that New Mexico failed "to demonstrate that its
interests outweigh the public's right to at some point receive truthful and nonmisleading written advertising that is plainly and conspicuously marked
'Advertising Material' or 'Lawyer Advertising.' "0 3
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly decided the Revo case. The
Supreme Court has developed a strong body of case law protecting printed lawyer
advertising. The decision in FloridaBarconstituted only a small deviation from this
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 935-36.
See id. at 936.

101.

Id.

102. See id
103. Id.
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trend because it permits states to place only an extremely limited ban on lawyer
advertising, not a complete one. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Revo
is consistent with the Supreme Court's general acceptance of lawyer advertising.
The Revo decision is also in line with the Supreme Court's general aversion to
complete bans and its deference to increased public awareness in the area of
commercial speech. The Supreme Court has long since recognized the tension
between the dangers of suppressing information and the dangers of allowing its
dissemination."" The Supreme Court has chosen to move in the direction of
allowing the free flow of information in the context of written lawyer
advertisements instead of upholding complete bans. In both Bates and Shapero, the
and
Court decided that the dangers involved in completely suppressing truthful
the speech.10 5
accurate lawyer advertising outweighed any dangers in permitting
The Supreme Court treats lawyer advertising cases like other commercial
advertising cases. Even in commercial product advertising cases, the Supreme Court
opposes complete bans. In 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island,"6 the Court held
that a Rhode Island law completely forbidding the advertisement of liquor prices
was unconstitutional.0 7 The judgment in 44 Liquormart was unanimous even
though the Court split in its reasoning. Justice Stevens and three other Justices used
°9
the Central Hudson test 0" to arrive at their opinion." They reasoned that a
complete ban on the advertisement of liquor prices did not significantly promote the
'
goal of reducing alcohol consumption in the state. 10 Justice O'Connor and three
other Justices also applied the Central Hudson test and found that the final prong
of the test, which requires that a regulation be sufficiently narrowly tailored, was
unmet."' They noted that the Rhode Island ban was not narrowly tailored because
other alternatives, such as raising taxes to reduce alcohol consumption, would
achieve the same goal while being less restrictive."' Finally, Justice Thomas chose
not to use the CentralHudson test, contending that the government's interest in
3
maintaining public ignorance is per se illegitimate."
A majority of the Court in 44 Liquormartexpressed support for a stricter review
of commercial speech regulation even though there was disagreement on how to

104. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977).
105. See id. at 383-84; Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988).
106. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
107. See id. at 516.
108. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
109. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 508 (opinion of Stevens, Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.); see also
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CT., FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION SYMPOSIUM 600-04
(1997) [hereinafter GEORGETOWN SECTION 1983 SYMPoSIUM]. There was no majority holding in 44 Liquormart.
There were four separate opinions authored by: 1) Justice Stevens; 2) Justice O'Connor; 3) Justice Thomas and 4)
Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but did not expressly concur in any of the other Justices'
opinions. See 517 U.S. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia did
not believe that the legitimacy of the Central Hudson test was in front of the Court at this time and as a result, he
deferred to existing jurisprudence and merely concurred in the judgment of the Court on this issue. See id.
110. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 498 (opinion of Stevens, Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.). See also
GEORGETOWN SECTION 1983 SYMPOSIUM, supra note 109, at 595.
111. See 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 532 (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
See also GEORGETOWN SECTION 1983 SYMPOSIUM, supra note 109, at 595.
112. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Seeid.at523.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

make it stricter." 4 Justice Stevens' group (four votes) in 44 Liquormartheld that
"complete bans on commercial speech-as opposed to other regulation-will
be
more highly scrutinized and will fail.""' 5 Justice Thomas adopted a functionally
equivalent view by holding that the goal of preserving consumer ignorance, "the
usual result of a flat ban on speech, is never a permissible state end.""' 6 Justice
O'Connor's group (four votes, concurring) would apply the final prong of the
Central Hudson test more strictly to require that "no regulation be upheld unless it
is narrowly pursued by less drastic means.""'
At the very least, the 44 Liquormartdecision demonstrates the Supreme Court's
desire to treat cases involving complete bans with even more caution than it has in
the past. Consequently, the fact that the Revo court also proceeded with caution and
looked for less restrictive alternatives to ensure that the public's right to information
was not suppressed parallels the Supreme Court's current approach.
VI. THE FUTURE OF LAWYER ADVERTISING IN NEW MEXICO
In his dissent in Bates, Justice Powell noted that the Court's decision to permit
lawyer advertising will cause "profound changes in the practice of law.""' Indeed,
twenty years later, the effect of Bates and its progeny can be seen in New Mexico.
According to a May 1997 poll commissioned by the State Bar, in a random sample
of New Mexicans, fifty-six percent of survey respondents said that they had a
negative impression of the legal profession because of lawyer advertising, while
only fifteen percent said they had a positive impression." 9
Given these statistics, the great concern about the impact of the Revo decision on
New Mexico is understandable. Specifically, there are three major concerns about
the Revo decision: 1) its effect on the reputation of the legal profession in New
Mexico; 2) its effect on the privacy rights of New Mexicans; and 3) its effect on
New Mexico lawyer advertising law.
The Revo decision's effect on the New Mexico Bar and the privacy rights of its
citizens is unpredictable. Whether or not the decision has a significant effect
depends on the number of New Mexico lawyers who choose to look at the Revo
decision as an invitation to use direct-mail solicitation of accident victims as a
means of advertising.
The Revo decision's effect on the legal profession may be insignificant. The fact
that direct-mail solicitation of accident victims is now legally permissible is not
likely to have a significant impact, given the already negative impression the public
has of lawyers. The facts of the Revo case indicate that New Mexico's ban on
direct-mail solicitation at the time it was enacted affected only four to eight

114. See GEORGETOWN SECTION 1983 SYMPoSIUM, supra note 109, at 604.
115. Id. at 602.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 603.
118. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 389 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
119. See Research & Polling, Inc., Poll Conducted for the State Bar of New Mexico, Table 58, Question 57
(May 1997) (on file with the New Mexico Law Review).
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lawyers.120 Moreover, there is no evidence that this small number has increased
significantly since the Revo decision, or that it will.
The Revo decision's effect on the privacy rights of New Mexicans will depend
on each individual letter recipient. While it is obvious that victims' privacy rights
are invaded when they receive a personalized letter from a stranger who is aware
of their suffering, this invasion is not necessarily burdensome. A victim who
receives a letter plainly and conspicuously marked "Advertising Material" or
"Lawyer Advertising," as in the Revo case,' 2' can throw the letter in the trash before
even opening it.2 Throwing the letter in the trash is only as burdensome as
discarding junk mail. Reading the letter, however, could be a burden on an
individual. It could either cause the individual more pain and suffering by virtue of
having to re-live the traumatic experience, or it could provide the individual with
information and even some hope of just compensation for pain and suffering.
Therefore, whether receiving direct-mail solicitations will cause an unacceptable
invasion of New Mexicans' privacy rights depends on each individual. In other
words, the Revo decision may cause anywhere from a mild to a severe impact on
victims' privacy rights.
The Revo decision's effect on New Mexico lawyer advertising law seems more
rule
predictable. The decision will likely encourage the Bar to adopt a thirty-day
23 and in many other states. 124 This
Florida
similar to the one currently enforced in
is because New Mexico has limited options. New Mexico can do one of three
things: 1) completely permit direct-mail solicitation of accident victims; 2) adopt
a thirty-day rule pursuant to the Florida Bar decision to restrict direct-mail
solicitation for thirty days; or 3) create its own time frame and seek to restrict
direct-mail solicitation for a different number of days. Given the state's aversion to
direct-mail solicitation, it is unlikely that the state will choose the first option,
leaving New Mexico either to accept the thirty-day rule or to fashion a rule with a
different time limitation (e.g., forty-five day ban) 25 and be prepared to litigate the
matter. At this point, given the enormous amount of time and money that was spent
to try the Revo case, it is unlikely that New Mexico will litigate this matter any
further. Therefore, it seems likely that New Mexico will adopt the thirty-day rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Revo is in line with Supreme Court precedent.
The decision favors lawyer advertising and the free flow of information. The
decision does not, however, completely prevent New Mexico from pursuing its
substantial interests in protecting the reputation of the bar and the privacy of its
citizens. Although New Mexico cannot constitutionally enact a complete ban on
direct-mail solicitation to accident victims and their families, it can legally enact a

120. See Revo, 106 F.3d at 936.
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 637 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123. FLA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-7.4(b)(A).
124. See, e.g., ALA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 7.3(b)(1)(i); S.C. R. PROF. CONDUCT 7.3(b)(3); TENN. R. PROF.
CONDUCT 2-104 (C)(1)(a).
125. Nevada has adopted a forty-five day rule that has not yet been challenged. See NEV. SUP. Cr. R. 197(4).
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thirty-day ban on such solicitations in order to protect these valuable interests
pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in FloridaBar. The thirty-day rule strikes
an effective balance between the free flow of information and important state
interests.
FARZANA KANJI

